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Introduction 
Railway infrastructures have been one of the most usual scenarios of forced 
labour, and throughout the 20th century captives have been deployed in that 
sector not only in colonial empires,1 but also in Europe, within contexts of 
war2 and dictatorship.3 So, it is not surprising that in the course of  the Span-
* An earlier version of  this paper was presented at the 16th Annual Conference of  the 
European Business History Association (Paris, 2012). I want to thank Alessandro Stanziani, 
the discussant of  the 9. E. session at this Conference, for his helpful comments, and Mark Spo-
erer, for providing the English version of  his article “Profitierten Unternehmen…”. The arti-
cle is part of  the research project “El control del delito en la España contemporánea: discur-
sos de seguridad, instituciones punitivas y prácticas de excepcionalidad” (HAR2013-40621-P), 
funded by the Spanish Ministry of  Science and Innovation; the project’s main researcher is Pe-
dro Oliver Olmo (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha). I also want to thank Robert Curwen 
for his help with the translation to English.
1. Before World War I, Germany put Onjembo prisoners to work in railway construc-
tion in Namibia (Erichsen, 2005). For forced labour on railway infrastructures in French Co-
lonial Africa, see Fall (1993, pp. 203-219). Under British rule, workers for the railways in the 
Gold Coast were recruited “on the shadowy borderline between ‘communal’ and ‘forced’ la-
bour” (Thomas, 1973, p. 103). 
2. For World War I, see Palla, (1995) and Davis (1977). During World War II, thousands 
of  forced labourers had to work for the Deutsche Reichbahn (Mierzejewski, 2000; Megargee, 
2009) or on other railway infrastructures throughout Europe (Erez, 2000; Guttermann, 2001; 
Megargee, 2009; Westerlund, 2010). Spanish exiles were also forced to work, under the Vichy 
regime, in Djelfa (Algeria), on the construction of  the projected Trans-Saharan Railway (In-
ternational Tracing Service, 1949, p. 15; Morro, 2012). In Japanese-Occupied South East Asia, 
local inhabitants (Melber, 2016) and nearly 60,000 POWs worked on the Siam–Burma Railway 
(Sareen, 2005).
3. Apart from the already mentioned Nazi rule, for Soviet Union under Stalin see Greg-
ory and Lazarev (2007) and Mote (2003).
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ish Civil War its use on railway infrastructures was considered from the very 
beginning by the Francoist side,4 and that between 1938 and 1957, thousands 
of  captive workers were engaged in that kind of  work. Twenty years, there-
fore, of  forced and unfree labour on the railways, arising in a context of  civil 
war and prolonged – albeit with certain modifications – during the subse-
quent dictatorship. 
As a matter of  fact, this was not the first time for captives working on 
Spanish railways, as in the 19th century Spanish prisoners were also occasion-
ally used on the railway, and slaves worked on several lines in Cuba until the 
abolition of  slavery in this Spanish colony in 1886;5 but our research will fo-
cus now on the only period in the 20th century when unfree labour has been 
deployed for railways enterprises and infrastructure. 
Despite its importance in repairing and extending the railway network, 
the role of  captive labour in these tasks has been scantily treated by Spanish 
historiography.6 This lack of knowledge must be understood within the frame-
work of insufficient remembrance policies in Spain following the death of  the 
dictator, and the absence of  any requirement that enterprises should publicly 
respond for the use of captive labour.7 While historiography concerning forced 
labour has undergone considerable development in recent years,8 this has been 
carried out with serious problems of access to documentation, scarce and dis-
persed, and, unlike the German case, practically without being able to con-
sult company documentation. Furthermore, recently, in April 2013, the Span-
ish Defence Ministry denied the declassification of  about 10,000 historical 
documents (from 1936-1953), many of  them closely related to concentration 
camps and POW labour battalions, so that they could be consulted by histo-
rians.9 
4. For an overall view of repression in the civil war, see Preston (2012). Forced labour in 
Republican Spain during the civil war was much less significant than in Francoist Spain, and 
for railway infrastructures we only know about the use of  captive labour in opening up the line 
between Torrejón de Ardoz and Tarancón (Ruiz, 2009).
5. Before the civil war, in 19th century Spain prisoners were also occasionally used on 
the railway (Burillo, 1999, pp. 203 -247), and slaves worked on several lines in Cuba until the 
abolition of  slavery in this Spanish colony in 1886 (Zanetti and García, 1998). For a Longue 
Durée analysis of  forced labour in Spain see Oliver (2007) and Mendiola (2016).
6. See Lafuente, (2002), Olaizola, (2006), Quintero, (2009) and Mendiola, (2013b). Un-
fortunately, neither the new historiographical orientation concerning the railways, with great-
er attention given to labour policies, nor the recent works on the war’s impact on enterprises 
and railway infrastructures mention the reality of  forced labour (Martínez Vara, 2005; Balles-
teros and Martínez Vara, 2011; Cayón and Muñoz, 2009).
7. For remembrance policies in the Spanish transition see, mainly, Espinosa (2006 and 
2015), Ranzato (2007) and Aguilar (2008).
8. González Cortés (2014). We must remark the importance of  recent García-Funes’ re-
search (2017a and 2017b).
9. For more information, see http://www.tiempodehistoria.com/2013/04/18/el-ministerio-
de-defensa-rechaza-un-recurso-de-alzada-para-desclasificar-10-000-documentos-de-la-guerra-
civil-and-posguerra.html 
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In this article, we shall be examining this reality in depth, with our analy-
sis centred on economic logic and entrepreneurial strategies and attitudes con-
cerning the use of forced labour, differentiating between the reality of prison-
ers of war (POWs) during the war and its immediate aftermath, and prisoners 
from 1940 onwards. So, throughout the article we will deal with this duality of 
captive work, that of POWs depending on the Concentration Camps Inspec-
torate, and that of prisoners previously sentenced.10 These two modalities can 
be included in the recent taxonomy of labour relations elaborated by the The 
Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations (International Insti-
tute of Social History), where “forced labour” (workers included conscripted 
soldiers and convicts) and “tributary slaves” (workers included concentration 
camp inmates) appear within the category of  “tributary labour”.11 Moreover, 
this research addresses one of  the main goals that the recent historiography 
on forced labour has underlined, that of  the relationships between free and 
unfree labour in the articulation of  historical labour markets.12 
In this case, we have to take into account the already classic explanation 
by Fenoaltea,13 who proposes a model in which the majority use of  forced la-
bour on infrastructural work corresponds to its characteristics, which are 
much more intensive in effort than in care. More recently, following this ar-
gument, Acemoglu and Wolitzky have pointed out “the complementarity be-
tween effort and coercion”,14 remarking that effort-intensive labour is more 
likely to be deployed under coercive measures than some others more quali-
fied. This will enable us to better understand the rapid start of  railway con-
struction following the war and to advance the analysis of  the relations be-
tween entrepreneurial strategies and fascist regimes.15 
In order to better understand business strategies we must consider, follow-
ing the contributions of  transaction cost economics, enterprise as a govern-
ance structure that has to decide the framework in which transactions are car-
10. For further description of  the Spanish forced labour system under Franco’s dictator-
ship see Mendiola (2013a) and García-Funes (2017a and 2017b).
11. Hofmeester and Lucassen (2013). For an updated explanation of  the taxonomy and 
recent modifications, see Hofmeester, Lucassen, Lucassen, Stapel and Zijdeman (2015). 
12. Bugglen (2008), van der Linden (2012), Stanziani, (2013), de Vito and Lichtenstein 
(2015), Brass (2014) and Rodríguez García (2016). 
13. Fenoaltea (1984).
14. Acemoglu and Wolitzki, (2011, pp. 587-588).
15. Attitudes about the deployment of  forced labour has been one of  the most impor-
tant issues for historians researching the relationships between business and the Nazi regime. 
Mainly, amongst a rich body of  literature, see Herbert (1997), Spoerer (2010), Bugglen (2015) 
and Wachsmann (2015). Another interesting focus of  research is the implication of  non-Ger-
man enterprises in the deployment of  forced labour in Nazi-occupied Europe, such as Danish 
construction firms (Lund, 2010). For a debate about the role of  business and its independence 
under Nazism, see Bucheim and Scherner (2006) and Hayes (2009). For overviews of  the rela-
tionships between Spanish business and politics under Franco’s dictatorship, see Cabrera and 
Del Rey, (2002) and Sánchez Recio and Tascón (2003).
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ried out: the classic dilemma of make or buy.16 So, we should also ask at which 
moment and for what reasons enterprises decide to have recourse to forced 
labour when the institutional framework permits this possibility.17 Setting out 
from the premise that “hierarchy is favored as the asset specificity sets up”,18 
we shall attempt in this concrete case to explain how, in a labour shortage sit-
uation, some enterprises secured this asset – labour force – by having recourse 
to other much more hierarchical and disciplined structures: prisons and con-
centration camps. Nevertheless, although ever since Domar’s seminal article19 
the relationship between coercion and labour shortage – labour demand effect 
– has been present in research about slavery, some other authors have under-
lined that scarcity cannot always explain the demand for unfree labour.20 
To that end, we will start with a quantitative approach for all the period, 
and later, in following sections, we will focus on the different modalities of 
firms and captives, from POWs to prisoners, and from private companies to 
the new public enterprise, RENFE, born in 1941. 
Forced labour on the Spanish railways: A quantitative approach
The first challenge that historians face to completely measure the contribu-
tion of forced labour to railway infrastructure during this period is the great 
fragmentation of documentation, mainly that of the Workers’ Battalions (BB.
TT. – Batallones de Trabajadores).21 Nonetheless, in spite of those methodolog-
16. The influence of  institutional change on the behaviour of  enterprises has been one 
of the main contributions of New Institutional Economics. A theoretical approach to the study 
of  forced labour employing these proposals can be found in Eggertsson (1990, pp. 203-213).
17. Obviously, we are leaving aside the significant intentionality and political function-
ality of  the recourse to forced labour, analysed in Spain by Acosta et al. (2004), Rodrigo (2005, 
2012), Gómez (2008), Mendiola (2014), Mendiola y Beaumont (2006) and García-Funes 
(2017a and 2017b) and Mendiola and Beaumont (2006), amongst others. In the German case, 
different research projects have also stressed the importance of  factors relating to ethnic or so-
cial policies, prior to the shortage of  labour during the war becoming a serious economic prob-
lem, for the creation of  forced labour systems (Roth, 1997; Jaskot, 2000; Gruner, 2006; Bug-
glen, 2015, and Wachsmann, 2015). 
18. Williamson (2002, p. 181).
19. Domar (1970). 
20. Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2008, pp. 587-588), van der Linden, (2008, pp. 39-54), 
Moulier-Boutang (2006, pp. 908-921), and Green (2014). For an overview on Domar’s hypoth-
esis as an explanatory factor for forced labour demand in Spanish capitalism, see Mendiola 
(2016).
21. These battalions of  POWs depended on the Inspectorate of  POW Concentration 
Camps [ICCP - Inspección de Campos de Concentración de Prisioneros], which filed a monthly 
report on the location and work of  each of  their members. Unfortunately, only two complete 
series of  these reports are available for historians, those of  December 1938 and January 1939 
(AGMA, CCG, 1, 46bis, 8 and AGMA, CCG, 1, 46bis, 9). There are also lists of  the roll calls 
taken of  these battalions contained in the Archive of  the Court of  Accounts [Archivo del Tri-
bunal de Cuentas] (Documentary Centre of  Historical Memory [Centro Documental de la Me-
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ical problems, we have been able to locate most of the work carried out by cap-
tives between 1937 and 1957,22 an indispensable previous stage for a further ex-
planation of the different business strategies related to forced labour.  
As we can see in Figure 1, from 1938 onwards several thousand captives 
worked on railways, especially in 1939 and 1940, years in which the number 
of  forced labourers exceeded 8,000. In January 1939, in the final months of 
the war, work on the railway represented 7.1% of that done by POWs.23 The 
figures remained close to 3,000 until 1945, and from then onwards fell appre-
ciably,24 with the total number remaining under 500 during the 1950s, until in 
1957 they completely disappeared, 13 years before the definitive abandon-
ment, in 1970, of  the use of  prisoners in exterior works. 
moria Histórica], Salamanca), but in this case they only mention the location of the High Com-
mand, although the companies were often in different places, without specifying the work done. 
This information has been completed with partial references contained in documents of  the 
General Military Archive of  Ávila [AGMA – Archivo General Militar de Ávila].
22. For a complete record of  these locations, with their date and number of  workers, see 
Mendiola, 2013b.
23. Mendiola (2013a, p. 190).
24. We should not forget, as well, that this decline can also be observed in the whole of 
the prison population. From nearly 280,000 prisoners of  both sexes in 1939 (to whom must be 
added, that year, more than 100,000 captives in Workers’ Battalions and Concentration 
Camps), the number falls to 43,822 in 1945 and to 15,602 in 1960, according to the Memoran-
da of  the Directorate General of  Prisons [DGP – Dirección General de Prisiones]. 
FIGURE 1 ▪ Evolution of the number of forced workers in railway infrastructures
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the AGMA, AGTC and Memoranda of the Prison General Direc-
torate. Further details in Mendiola (2013b).
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Now, to better understand this evolution, we must also consider the insti-
tutional change that determined the supply of this type of labour, as well as 
the POW/prisoners duality on which the Francoist system of forced labour was 
based. In fact, while on its emergence forced labour in Spain basically involved 
POWs integrated in BB.TT. between 1938 and 1940, and in Disciplinary Bat-
talions of Worker-Soldiers (BDST – Batallones Disciplinarios de Soldados Tra-
bajadores) between 1940 and 1945, the practice of setting incarcerated prison-
ers of both sexes to work started from 1939 onwards. Although this was a 
variety that initially involved lower numbers, it was nonetheless to have a much 
greater duration in time.25
Figure 2 shows the weight of  each of  these modalities in railway works. It 
is clear that until 1942 the majority of  the workers were POWs, while from 
1943 onwards forced labour on the railway lines was done almost exclusively, 
and after 1946 exclusively, by prisoners. With respect to the latter’s character-
istics, while the use of  prisoners for work was initially proposed for political 
prisoners, from 1944 onwards common prisoners also started to be deployed, 
given the overall fall in the prison population. It was precisely on a railway 
works site, the Penal Detachment of  Loyozuela on the Madrid–Burgos line, 
where non-political prisoners were deployed for the first time.
25. For overall figures of  different modalities of  forced labour, see Mendiola, (2013a, 
p. 189). For the most recent update, see García-Funes (2017a).
FIGURE 2 ▪ Legal modality of the forced workers in railway infrastructures
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the AGMA, AGTC and Memoranda of the Prison General Direc-
torate. Further details in Mendiola (2013b).
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With respect to the type of work, Figure 3 shows that in the wartime years 
repair work is what required the most labour,26 a situation that changed dur-
ing 1940 and 1941, when this task was surpassed by that of  building double 
track along some stretches, while from 1942 onwards the work on which the 
captive population was most engaged was the opening up of  new lines. Re-
garding repair work, in 1939 there were as many as 8,000 POWs working on 
these tasks, with the figure also reaching 4,000 in 1938 and 1940. 
In these years, the BB.TT. were used and rapidly transferred from one lo-
cality to another, in order to repair damage to infrastructure and make pos-
sible its swift return to use. In terms of  the opening of  new lines, it should be 
mentioned that during the war the work of  POWs was concentrated on set-
ting up the Val de Zafan railway between Alcañiz (Teruel) and Tortosa (Tarra-
gona), to the south of the Ebro, a railway that was used intensively during the 
battle of the Ebro in 1938.27 In the aftermath of the war, the opening of the new 
Madrid–Burgos line was the priority for forced labour.
26. In spite of  their detailed descriptions, reference to the work of  POWs is totally ab-
sent from the first publication on repairing war damages: García Lomas (1940).
27. During this battle, one of  the most important and meaningful in the Spanish Civil 
War, this railway transported 3,000 tons of  war material per day, according to the Enterprise 
Memoranda (Memoria del Consejo de Administración. Ejercicios 1936, 1937, 1938, and de 1º de 
enero a 31 de mayo de 1939; (AHF, Libro 31 bis, p. 30). 
FIGURE 3 ▪ Type of work realized by captives in railway infrastructures
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the AGMA, AGTC and Memoranda of the Prison General Direc-
torate. Further details in Mendiola (2013b).
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The private railway enterprises and the work of POWs:  
The case of MZA (1938-1940).
The greater part of  the work of  POWs was controlled and organized by 
the army itself  through the Workers’ Battalions (BB.TT.), and was very rare-
ly directed at satisfying the needs of  private enterprises, except where these 
were considered to be of  strategic importance.28 One of  these exceptions was 
precisely the railways, in private hands in Spain until 1941, but with a grow-
ing public intervention. Actually, and as a result of  this, Franco’s government 
passed a law just before the end of  the war, on 8 March 1939, according to 
which railway companies’ “boards of  directors” (consejos de administración) 
were replaced by the new “Direction  Boards” (consejos directivos), where 
members designated by the government had much more power. Despite the 
fact that the work of  POWs remains hidden in much of  the available docu-
mentation,29 in the case of  the Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante Company (MZA) 
we are able to trace the evolution of its strategy in relation to the use of  forced 
labour from 1937 until its dissolution in January 1941. 
Now, in order to understand this strategy we must bear in mind the effects 
of  the war on railway infrastructure, the institutional supply of  captive la-
bour, and also the situation of  the company itself. This enterprise was one of 
the two biggest Spanish enterprises in the first third of  the twentieth centu-
ry,30 and it had some 30,000 workers prior to the war.31 Nonetheless, in spite 
of  its apparent strength, the company suffered from a serious financial situ-
ation, a problem predating the outbreak of  the war and shared with the ma-
jority of  railway enterprises. This resulted in a profound transformation of 
the business structure of  the railway in Spain with the appearance in 1941 of 
RENFE, the public railway enterprise.32
As can be seen in Figure 4, MZA was the company that took recourse in 
the most systematic way to the use of  POWs between 1938 and 1940, above 
Compañía de los Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España and Ferrocarriles del 
Oeste. The year when forced labour was most significant for the company was 
1939, with 5,225 POWs, a figure that represents 16.3% of the total personnel 
28. For a detailed analysis of  the process of  formation of  the BB.TT. in the concentra-
tion camps, see Rodrigo (2005) and García-Funes (2017a). Some militarized industries and 
iron mines can be found amongst the exceptions, one of  the most important being the Basque 
case (Mendiola, 2012).
29. With respect to the railway enterprises, this invisibility already starts in the compa-
nies’ own memoranda, (available in the Historical Railway Archive) and continues in part of 
the archived documentation, with the exception of  the MZA railway company.
30. From the start of  the twentieth century, the two biggest railway companies, MZA 
and Compañía de los Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España, were the two biggest Spanish en-
terprises in numbers of  assets (Carreras and Tafunell, 1993).
31. Ballesteros and Martínez Vara (2011, p. 649).
32. Muñoz (1995) and Cayón and Muñoz (2009).
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in 1935.33 Regarding this, we must take into account that this new modality 
of  workers, the POWs, represented an important shift in the previous evolu-
tion of  labour policies within the enterprise, which had been enforcing the 
consolidation of  Internal Labour Markets.34
Already in 1937, we know of the offer made on 20 July by the Lieutenant 
Colonel Head of  the Military Railway Service to the director of  the MZA 
company “to be able to draw up a plan of  public works in which use would 
be made of  the labour of  prisoners of  war and political prisoners”,35 but this 
was turned down by MZA, which claimed that “at present we do not have any 
work to which the indicated arrangements could be applied”.36 Nonetheless, 
in spite of  that initial rejection, we have managed to verify that by the end of 
1938 over 2,000 POWs were working on railway infrastructures of  MZA.
33. Figures for personnel (33,792, without counting workers in the mines) provided by 
Ballesteros and Martínez Vara (2011, p. 649). The documentation of  the company does not 
register the total number of  workers during the war years, which would presumably have been 
lower, thus the percentage of  forced workers over the total would certainly be higher.
34. For an analysis of  the labour policy and the Internal Labour Markets in MZA, see 
Portillo and Mar (2008), and Martínez Vara (2005).
35. Historical Railway Archive [AHF – Archivo Histórico Ferroviario], C-1368-003.
36. Reply from the President of  the Board of Directors of  MZA to the Lieutenant Colo-
nel Head of  the Military Railway Service. Valladolid, 28 July 1937. AHF, C-1368-003.
FIGURE 4 ▪ Number of POWs working for the different Spanish railway enterprises*
* When calculating totals per company, the maximum numbers of workers per battalion working for the company 
have been added up, without taking account of the time worked. In cases where a battalion might have worked in 
two or more companies, it appears counted in both. The number is higher, as the mobility of workers within battal-
ions is not registered.
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the AGMA, AGTC and Memoranda of the Prison General Direc-
torate. Further details in Mendiola (2013b).
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As we have indicated above, recourse to the work of  POWs is to be ex-
plained, in the first place, as being due to the shortage of  labour in a context 
of  war, repression, and the need for reconstruction.37 This loss of  human cap-
ital affected railway companies, which were also involved in a depuration pro-
cess for their workers. As a result, more than half  of  their workers received 
some kind of  sanction because of  their political attitude, and 12% of them 
were dismissed.38
In this situation, railway enterprises were demanding extra labour in or-
der to rapidly repair damage. This reasoning appears in the MZA company’s 
own documentation, one example of  which is the document that the Chief 
Engineer of  Tracks and Works showed to the Director of  MZA in April 1939 
to convince the latter to request new battalions of  POWs in order to repair 
several stations between Madrid and Aranjuez:
At present our service is dealing with the work of  clearance and repairs with the 
very few members of  our own personnel that we have managed to assemble, aid-
ed by a company from Workers’ Battalion number 2 and another from number 
16 that is working in Villaverde. Now, given the enormous labour that is neces-
sary to carry out to put all these installations into minimum conditions for their 
utilization, to continue at the same rhythm as up to now would mean that this 
work would have a duration that is incompatible with the need of  making these 
installations available as soon as possible.39
Labour shortage is also mentioned to explain the deployment of  POWs 
on other railways,40 such asthe Val de Zafán railway in 1938, but in this case 
there is another reason used to justify it, that of  its lower, or extremely low 
cost, as can be read in this report: “the deployment of  POWs has been 
planned, not only because this would make the works much cheaper, but also 
because of  the impossibility of  assembling, under current circumstances, the 
required labour force”.41
37. The need for labour is fundamental to understanding the recourse to forced labour; 
this has been documented in the Basque case by Mendiola (2012), and also in Germany by 
Herbert (1997), Tooze (2006) and Wachsmann (2015).
38. Muñoz (2009, p. 211) and Polo Muriel (2015). For overall estimates of  human capi-
tal losses in the early years of  Franco’s dictatorship, see Nuñez (2003). 
39. Letter dated 16 April 1939. The next day the Director of  MZA requested that the 
Lieutenant Colonel Head of  the Military Railway Service send “four new companies” (that is, 
some 600 POWs) for that purpose. AHF, C-0395-005.
40. García-Funes (2017a).
41. Report by the Military Railway Service to Franco’s General Headquarters, 29 No-
vember 1938 (Dueñas, 2013). This is only one of  the different cases of  POWs working on this 
railway, and in this occasion the request was rejected by the Concentration Camps Inspector-
ate, because it did not meet the requirements of  the normative about captives’ work (García-
Funes, 2017a).
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That kind of  specific and empirical information about the cheaper cost is 
very important to understanding company strategies beyond legality, because 
while the legislation on forced labour envisaged that companies using prison-
ers or POWs should pay the state the daily wage established by local work 
regulations,42 the available documentation on railway infrastructures shows 
us that this was not always obeyed. An extreme case, although exceptional, 
was the offer in May 1939 by the captain of  a nearby concentration camp in 
Valsequillo (Córdoba) to MZA to use POWs in repair work on the railway 
line in a “completely free” way, which finally did not take place because the 
POWs were moved from the camp. 43
For the MZA company we have found continuous references to claims by 
the state that lead us to think that this requirement was not always met, and 
that MZA was normally reluctant to pay for the use of  POWs.44 That is, at 
least, what was alleged in February 1940, facing a claim for payment pending 
for the work of  BB.TT. 143 in the area around Algodor and Aranjuez, to 
which MZA’s Chief  Engineer of  Tracks and Works replied that this question 
“is pending the result of  a proposal that the Military Railway Directorate has 
made to the Ministry of  the Army”.45 This leads us to consider, even at a time 
when private railway companies, such as MZA, were ruled by government-des-
ignated directors, a conflict of  interests between the income to be received by 
the state due to the work of  POWs – which should be paid by the companies 
deploying POWs – and the need to swiftly reorganize railway infrastructure 
following the war.
It is precisely from the autumn of 1939 onwards, when those claims be-
gan to be received, that MZA changed its position with respect to the work 
of  POWs and requested the withdrawal of  the battalions, using arguments 
about supposed disorganization of the works, the fact that they spent the time 
without working, their lower level of  profitability or their lack of  qualifica-
tions. Also in another big railway company, Compañía de los Caminos de Hier-
ro del Norte de España, the testimony of  a company official mentions the dif-
ficulty of  obtaining high performance while using prisoners of  war and the 
need to relax disciplinary conditions in order to increase productivity.46
Several documents in this respect have been conserved, of  which one of 
the clearest is a letter from the Director of  the company to the Colonel Head 
of  the Military Railway Service, in which he requested the withdrawal of  the 
 
42. “Decree granting the right to work to prisoners and POWs”, Boletín Oficial del Es-




46. Díaz Sánchez (2003).
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battalions arguing that “the average performance per individual is markedly 
lower than that of  a free worker”.47
In any case, in spite of  these requests, and of  the supposedly lower prof-
itability, MZA continued to have nearly 4,000 POWs working on its railway 
lines and stations during the first months of  the year 1940, until the majority 
of  the Workers’ Battalions were disbanded.
When these private companies disappeared and were integrated in the new 
public railway company, RENFE, in January 1941, the economic situation in 
Spain had changed somewhat. Labour shortages related to war had largely 
disappeared, although remained in some qualified jobs, and real wages had 
declined sharply compared to the pre-war situation. In that conjuncture, when 
the Spanish economy was taking a labour-intensive path, with very low pro-
ductivity levels and growth rates,48 deployment of  captive workers is to be un-
derstood with a different logic. Why, if  there was no general labour shortage 
and work was so unusually cheap, did forced labour continue to be significant 
for the expansion of  railway infrastructure? That is, mainly, the question that 
we will try to answer in the next two parts. 
The work of POWs on railway infrastructure used by the public company 
RENFE (1941-1945)
As we saw in Figure 2, the disbanding of  the BB.TT. in 1940 did not mean 
the end of  the work of  POWs on railway infrastructures, since these battal-
ions were replaced by the BDST between mid-1940 and 1945, which were, in 
fact, the principal form of forced labour in general, and of  railway work in 
particular, during 1941 and 1942. These battalions were created in 1940 with-
in the framework of  a process of  reorganizing the concentration camp struc-
ture, which was from then on known as the Directorate of  Concentration 
Camps and Disciplinary Battalions (JCCBD – Jefatura de Campos de Con-
centración y Batallones Disciplinarios), and were formed of youths classified 
as “opposed” to the regime. Thus, in spite of  their peculiarities and their re-
lationship with the reorganization of the military service, the BDST have been 
considered by both historiography and Spanish legislation as forced labour 
 
47. AHF, C-0395-005. Letter of  12 January 1940 from the Director of MZA to the Colo-
nel Head of  the Military Railway Service.
48. For the fall in real salaries see Vilar (2009, pp. 135-154). For changes and reinforcing 
discipline in labour market regulations see Babiano (2011) and Vilar (2013). In the Spanish 
economy as a whole after the war we witness a fall in productivity per hour worked (Prados de 
la Escosura and Rosés, 2010, p. 528). This, of  course, was very closely related to the especially 
low rates of  growth if  we compare it with other European after-war reconstruction processes, 
Catalán (2003).  
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units, organized and designed according to the logic of  war and the manage-
ment of  POWs, on the margins of  the penal system.49
Of their almost 50,000 members, between 2,000 and 4,000 worked on rail-
way infrastructures from 1940 to 1943. However, unlike the case of the BB.TT., 
they were no longer working on improving the infrastructures belonging to 
private enterprises, since the greater part of  the railway network and its en-
terprises were integrated into RENFE, the new public company created in 
January 1941. Nonetheless, it remains a historiographical challenge to detail 
the contractual relationship that might have existed between the Directorate 
of  Concentration Camps and RENFE, as well as the possible involvement of 
private construction enterprises that were working for the latter, as can be 
gathered from the memoirs of  one of  the POWs who worked in BDST (P) 
95.50 Actually, neither the publications, nor the company memoranda refer-
ring to the development of  new works, nor even the minutes of  the board of 
directors, make reference to the work of  POWs, something that is surely re-
lated to the existence of  contractor enterprises that were responsible for car-
rying out some of  the works, companies with which the battalions had rela-
tionships. 
Nonetheless, by means of  the internal documentation of  the BDST, espe-
cially the inspection reports of  the year 1942, as well from other types of 
sources, we can form some idea of  the features of  this railway work. It is ev-
ident that these battalions continued to experience significant problems of or-
ganization and productivity detected in the case of the BB.TT., along the lines 
previously set out by the management of  the MZA company.
In this respect, the main problem that we can observe in the internal doc-
umentation of  the BDST relates to the low productivity of  labour, which is 
noted in the report of  the Directorate of  Engineers of  the 4th Military Re-
gion on the Situación y cometidos de los Batallones de Trabajadores de esta 
región (Situation and performance of  the Workers’ Battalions of  this region). 
It proposes the replacement of  several of  these battalions by free personnel 
or prisoners from the Sistema de Redención de Penas (System of Punishment 
Redemption), in order to be able to assign the members of  the BDST to tasks 
of  military fortification. It indicates several cases, such as BDST 18 (Val de 
Zafán railway), that could be replaced by prisoners, a collective whose cost is 
“very high, but with a better performance”.51
49. Mendiola and Beaumont (2006). It was not until 2005 that these battalions were le-
gally declared part of  Francoist prison/concentration systems, when the Spanish Constitution-
al Court judged that members of  these battalions were captives forced to work (Sala Segunda. 
Sentencia 180/2005, 2005, 4 July, published in Boletín Oficial del Estado, 186, pp. 35-42).
50. Horcajada (2008, p. 138).
51. Barriuso (2006, pp. 70-74).  The higher cost is due to the fact that Decree of  May 
1937 established that in the case of  prisoners who were married or had children, a small sum 
(0.5 Pesetas per wife or child) could be diverted as family assistance (Mendiola, 2013a, p. 196).
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Mentions of  low labour productivity also appear in a large number of  in-
spection reports on the BDST made in mid-1942. While we have not found 
any individualized mention of  the battalions that were working on the rail-
way, the greater number of  the reports are explicit when it comes to making 
clear the problems of organization, management and productivity of this type 
of  punishment. In more than one case, they describe the lamentable physical 
condition of  the POWs, their lack of  clothing and shoes for going to work, 
or “the lack of  aptitude of  many of  the chiefs and captains that direct these 
squads”, as stated textually concerning the battalions of  the 4th Military Re-
gion. These included BDST 18, 46 and 48, which were undertaking different 
works on railway infrastructure during that year.52
On the other hand, the memoirs of  the POWs themselves also refer to this 
question, as occurs in the case of  two POWs of BDST (P) 95, which between 
June and December 1942 worked on laying the Madrid-Zaragoza double 
track, on the same route where the management of  MZA had previously re-
quested the withdrawal of  the battalions. In this case, the memoirs of  these 
POWs also stress lower productivity, due both to the strategies of  political re-
sistance and non-collaboration, and to the effect of  the conditions of  living 
and food, as can be seen in Arenal’s text:
The food was scarce and bad, practically potatoes and water, but on the contra-
ry they wanted the work to be productive, so we tacitly started to carry out pas-
sive resistance (…) The comrades responsible for emptying tubs so as to ‘open 
up’ the railway cutting allowed the loaders to pass, and we, using four stones that 
we placed perpendicularly and another to stick out, ‘filled’ the wagon. When we 
reached the dump, we only emptied out the one on top, and we returned with 
practically the same ones, although sometimes we had no choice but to empty 
them all, it all depended on the supervision. What is certain is that – according 
to production estimates made by the RENFE technicians – the work was only 
proceeding at 25%.53
Similarly, another POW working in the same railway line, J. M. Horcaja-
da, indicates in his memoirs that forced labourers were totally lacking in mo-
tivation towards the work, due both to the conditions of life and to the aware-
ness that any effort made in the work “was not going to bring any significant 
52. General Military Archive of  Ávila, Ministry of  the Army. C - 20904. For a more gen-
eral analysis of  the problems of  management and productivity in the BDST, see Mendiola and 
Beaumont, (2006), which examines the work on mountain roads in the Pyrenees in greater 
depth.
53. Arenal (1999, pp. 87-88). Arenal was working at this time, autumn/winter 1942, on 
the Madrid–Zaragoza line (Jubera, Soria), as part of  BDST (P) 95.
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improvements in our daily lives”.54 Both testimonies are a good example of 
the importance of  human agency, that of  the captives themselves, in varying 
the transaction costs in forced labour regimes, something that was stressed 
some time ago by authors like Eggertsson.55
That difficulty in achieving high productivity levels under such conditions, 
which clearly show features of  continuity with the former POW battalions, 
leads us to a question that has long been debated in the study of  forced la-
bour: that concerning the productivity of  this type of  labour in comparison 
with that of  free workers.56 Research carried out in Germany emphasizes the 
need for complex answers to this question, taking into account the different 
modalities of  forced labour, and also the influence of  captives’ agency and 
material conditions. Besides, variations in labour market, demand or war sit-
uations led enterprises to choose labour-intensive production, based on forced 
labour, in spite of  its lower productivity, while relegating possible investments 
in capital, technology or even training the workers themselves.57 In Spain, re-
cent research has also highlighted these variations in productivity levels,58 
mainly differentiating POW and prisoners labour, as we shall see in the fol-
lowing section.
Prisoner deployment by private construction companies (1941-1957)
As we have seen in Figure 2, from 1943 onwards most of  the work of  cap-
tive labour on the railway was concentrated in prisoners inserted in the Sys-
tem of Punishment Redemption through Work, who were basically working 
on opening new railway lines. This was, therefore, a significant change with 
respect to the previous situation, where there had been a predominance of 
POWs, and it was accompanied by a significant restructuring of  the railway 
infrastructure in Spain, with the appearance of  RENFE in 1941. Now, as in 
the case of  the POWs of the BDST, RENFE’s documentation does not con-
tain any mention in this respect either, given that the totality of  the work of 
prisoners, inserted in the System of Punishment Redemption through Work, 
 
54. Horcajada, (2008, p. 135)
55.  Eggertsson, (1990, p. 208-209)
56. In the case of  the mines of  Biscay (Spain), the mining companies also employed this 
argument in 1939 to request the replacement of  forced labour by free workers, Pastor (2010).
57. The debate dates to the abolition of  slavery in the USA (Fogel and Engerman, 1974). 
For Nazi Germany, Spoerer (1999, p. 68) shows us variations in productivity amongst differ-
ent kinds of  forced labour. For changes in productivity levels within the same enterprise ac-
cording to these different factors, see, amongst others, Herbert (1997), Gregor (1998), Wagner 
(2010) and Spoerer (2010).
58. Sánchez Albornoz (2003) and Mendiola (2013a).
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was done on opening new lines, contracted out to construction companies 
and dependent on the Ministry of  Public Works.59
Outstanding amongst the new lines was, without doubt, that which was 
to connect Madrid and Burgos, on which an average of  between 1,000 and 
2,000 prisoners worked during a large part of  the 1940s, divided into several 
detachments. While from 1947 onwards the annual number fell below 500, the 
final penal detachment on this line was not to close until 1956. This was a new 
line, considered a priority by the government,60 as was another of  the works 
involving prisoners, that of  Madrid–Zamora–Orense. The rest of  the works, 
carried out between 1941 and 1957, involved fewer personnel.61
With respect to the strategies and attitudes of  the construction companies 
towards the work of  prisoners, we have pointed out previously that both the 
59. A detailed description of  the railway works promoted by the Ministry of  Public 
Works in these years can be found in the speech of  the Minister of  Public Works, Suárez de 
Tangil (1954).
60. Decree of  20 December 1944, declaring the urgency of  the completion of  the works 
of  the Madrid–Burgos railway and its connections (Official State Bulletin [Boletín Oficial del 
Estado], 10 January 1945, pp. 342-343).
61. For more detailed information on the lines on which prisoners worked, see the re-
search of  Olaizola (2006) and Mendiola (2013b). For the Madrid-Burgos line, see Quintero 
(2009).
TABLE 1 ▪ Construction companies that used prisoners on railway infrastructures (1940-
1957)














A.B.C. 636,900 560 1360 41.2
H. Nicolás Gómez 798,225 385 982 39.2
Construcciones 
Elizaran 485,475 316 316 100.0
A. Marroquín 498,300 325 485 67.0
AMSA 346,050 70 70 100.0
C. Barnal 508,200 0 0
Marcor S.A. 1,062,525 131 131 100.0
MZOV 283,800 0 0
Banús /Jubán S.A. 109,650 90 265 34.0
4,729,125 1877 19602 9.6
Source: Olaizola (2006) and Memoranda of the Directorate General of Prisons (1940-1957). An average of 300 days 
work per year has been estimated.
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lack of  access to company documentation and the scant data provided by the 
public documentation leave us with many questions that remain unanswered. 
In any case, on the basis of  available data, we can identify which were the en-
terprises that used forced labour, as can be seen in Table 1, where we have 
made an estimate of  the total number of  days worked by prisoners in each 
enterprise. This enables us to affirm that, as a whole, the construction com-
panies profited from over 4.5 million days worked by prisoners between 1940 
and 1957, with MARCOR S.A. standing out, with over 1 million days.
Besides, taking the year 1943 as a reference, one of the years when most 
prisoners were working on railway works and in which the memorandum of 
the Directorate General of Prisons (DGP – Dirección General de Prisiones) is 
most exhaustive, we have been able to estimate the relative proportion of rail-
way works within the overall use of captive personnel by construction compa-
nies, in which a variety of situations could be verified. Indeed, while there were 
companies that put the majority of prisoners on railway works, in the enterpris-
es that used most prisoners on the railway that year, Ferrocarriles y Construc-
ciones ABC and H. Nicolás Gómez, the percentage represented by railway works 
was the lowest. That is to say, the use of prisoners on railway works by many 
companies should not be considered something exceptional, but rather normal 
in construction, where they were also used in other types of work.62
Another example of that diversity is Jubán S.A., the company that used cap-
tive labour for the longest time, between 1940 and 1970, and about which the 
memorandum of the DGP for the year 1954 – when the company was using 
prisoners on the Sukarrieta–Bermeo railway in Biscay – indicates the following:
[…] an already veteran enterprise in contracting with the Central Board, given 
that since the year 1940 it has been absorbing penal labour in railways, in the 
works at the Valley of  the Fallen, Torrejón de Ardoz, and now in the Bermeo de-
tachment (Biscay), and in this new situation we are indicating, in order to build 
a satellite city of  Madrid.63
In order to understand this option for forced labour, we must bear in mind 
not only questions related to the wages to be paid, but also the state of  the la-
bour markets and productivity levels. With respect to the first of  these fac-
tors, we have already indicated that the enterprises had in principle to pay the 
62. As we can conclude from the data for 1943, Ferrocarriles and Construcciones ABC 
also had hundreds of prisoners working on several roads and urban works in Gipuzkoa-Itziar, 
Zumarraga, Irun, Errenteria– and Burgos-Bujedo, and also on the dam at Anguiano (La Rio-
ja) and the cement factory in Arrona (Gipuzkoa). Regarding H. Nicolás Gómez, it deployed 
prisoners that year on several roads – Oropesa and Puerto del Arzobispo, in the province of To-
ledo – and in hydraulic works in the same province – Alberche reservoir, in Talavera de la Reina 
and the Puerto del Rey channel (Memorandum of the Directorate General of Prisons, 1943).
63. Memorandum of the Directorate General of  Prisons, 1954, pp. 62-63.
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minimum wage of  each locality, so that not much could be saved in that re-
spect, with the Public Treasury being the main beneficiary of  this system. 
Moreover, we must bear in mind, as mentioned before, the labour-intensive 
direction that the Spanish economy took as a whole after the civil war, with 
a fall in real salaries and work productivity, and that this ensured employers 
high profits without needing forced labour as the only way of  obtaining 
cheaper labourers. Now, the other two factors mentioned played key roles in 
explaining the use of  prisoners by construction companies.
With respect to the structure of the labour market, we should bear in mind 
that much of  the works, and especially the railway works, were carried out in 
areas far removed from population centres. In these areas, companies had to 
pay a higher salary as an incentive for the available labour to move there, and 
for greater availability and flexibility when it came to lengthening workdays 
once the workers had moved and been housed at the works site.64 So, even in 
a situation in which there was not a general labour shortage, the deployment 
of  captives came to provide companies with cheaper workers for lowly pop-
ulated areas.
This argument comes up time and again in the memoranda of  the DGP 
from 1940 until 1953, and it appears in a specific way in 1944 when explain-
ing its importance in the construction of  the new Burgos-Madrid railway, 
which is precisely where most prisoners were working:
It is not only the lack of  free labour that makes construction difficult; let us sup-
pose that it existed in abundance. Would the workers travel several kilometres 
every day from the closest population centre to start the workday at the estab-
lished time? In the case of  their doing so, with what energy would they manage 
the tools after several hours travel? So, the Board for Punishment Redemption 
has found the solution to this problem, installing suitable premises close to the 
sites […] The construction works of  the direct Madrid-Burgos railway, which for 
identical reasons would have been no more than a simple project in several of  its 
parts, were started using the same procedure.65
Thus, it is evident in this case that the use of forced labour clearly func-
tioned to reduce the transaction costs involved in the movement of workers to 
distant areas, at the same time as ensuring enterprises with a supply of an es-
sential specific asset – labour power – during the whole year, and especially in 
summer when the agriculture labour demand might push up wages. This prob-
64. This factor has been shown in the case of  the Pyrenees in Navarre in the works of 
Mendiola and Beaumont (2006) and Mendiola (2012); and, for the Soviet case, by van der Lin-
den (1997). 
65. Memoranda of  the DGP, 1944, 94-95.
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lem, mentioned in 1956 by the Memoranda of Prisons Directorate,66 had ap-
peared previously in some other railway infrastructure works, such as in South-
ern USA, where the cotton crop season made labour much more expensive for 
companies working in the railways after the American Civil War.67 In that kind 
of situation, convict labour was a cheaper alternative for businesses.
On the other hand, it is also necessary to bear in mind the differences in 
productivity levels that the system of  employing prisoners involved in com-
parison with that of  POWs. Within the frame of  the overall low productivi-
ty for Spanish labour during the decades after the war, the possibility of 
improving food, both through the companies themselves and through the 
solidarity of  prisoners’ families, was identified by the authorities as a key el-
ement in improving the prisoners’ productivity levels, as recognized in the 
memoranda of  the DGP. Besides, linking work with the shortening of  time 
in captivity and the possibility of  obtaining, thanks to overtime, a small in-
come that could directly add to family earnings, also represented clear incen-
tives that prompted many prisoners, especially married ones, to make the 
maximum effort in their work.68
In fact, while in the POW battalions the reference to productivity always 
appeared as a clear problem, the memoranda of  the DGP show that compa-
nies were satisfied with the levels of  productivity achieved by prisoners, a 
good example of  this being the following report:
According to certificates of  Don Junio Cifuentes Plato, principal manager of  the 
Banús Hermanos S.A. works in Bermeo, the convicts have behaved ‘admirably’, 
their performance being higher than would be normal in free workers, observing 
an excellent discipline, and showing good will at all times and dedicating all their 
faculties to the work.69
Conclusions
The data supplied clearly show us the importance of  captive labour in re-
pairing, improving and extending the network of  railway infrastructure, es-
pecially during the civil war and its immediate aftermath. In these years, the 
work was basically done by battalions of POWs in the framework of the Con-
66. Memoranda of  Prisons Directorate (p. 73).
67. Lichtenstein (1996, pp. 46-47). The same kind of  arguments appeared in colonial In-
dia, related to the deployment of  prisoners for some other public works, such as roads or chan-
nels (Joshi, 2012, pp. 285-287).
68. Different incentives, mainly Rowan system, were mentioned in the Memoranda of 
the DGP as an efficient way to improve prisoners’ productivity (Mendiola, 2013a, p. 202).
69. Memoranda of  the DGP, 1956, 76.
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centration Camps, but, nonetheless, the disbanding of  these battalions did 
not mean the disappearance of  captive work on the Spanish railway, which 
was maintained until 1957 through the use of  the incarcerated population. 
Thus, using the information available to date, and knowing that new re-
search might qualify or enrich what has been set out here, we have been able 
to identify three factors that explain the variations in the recourse to captive 
labour by the companies involved in railway infrastructure.
In the first place, we should bear in mind the wage differential between 
captive labour and free labour. While Francoist legislation indicated that the 
wage paid by the compnies to the state for hiring prisoners or POWs should 
be equivalent to that of  free labour, in the case of  the private railway enter-
prises, and of  MZA concretely, we have been able to verify that this regula-
tion was usually not completely fulfilled, so that recourse to forced labour was 
in fact a cheaper alternative in the case of  POWs, at least until 1940.
In the second place, making use of  the proposals of  transaction cost eco-
nomics, we have been able to confirm that the specificity of  the assets tended 
to facilitate hierarchical solutions for their provision, in this case through a 
legal framework that enabled access to institutions like the prison or the con-
centration camps as suppliers of workers. This factor operated both during the 
war, a time when the railway companies were also experiencing the overall 
problem of labour shortage, and during the dictatorship. In the latter case this 
involved construction companies having recourse to the work of prisoners in 
order to move workers at low cost to areas that were unpopulated or where lo-
cal labour was not sufficient for undertaking the work of extending the rail-
way track, now in the hands of the state and used mainly by RENFE, the pub-
lic railway company.
Finally, we should bear in mind the variations in levels of  productivity. 
While during the war the low costs of  POWs and the generalized scarcity of 
labour made it acceptable to maintain very low levels of  productivity, the 
post-war situation, and above all the recourse to the incarcerated population 
by construction companies, went hand-in-hand with an increase in produc-
tivity levels. This was due both to a slight improvement in material conditions 
and to incentives related to the duration of  the sentence and the possibility, 
not always guaranteed, that the families of  prisoners might obtain some ben-
efit from their extra work.
It is thus evident that the recourse to captive labour obeyed a logic that 
changed over these twenty years, and that was substantially different during 
the war and its aftermath. Now, over and above all of  these variations, the 
employment of  POWs and prisoners on railway works constituted good busi-
ness, both for the state and for the enterprises that used them. Clearly, at the 
cost of  much suffering.
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Of Firms and Captives: Railway Infrastructures and the Economics of 
Forced Labour (Spain, 1937–1957)
abstRact 
This article deals with the key economic points that explain the evolution of  the deploy-
ment of  prisoners and prisoners of  war on extending and reconstructing railways during the 
Spanish civil war and Franco’s dictatorship. The first part presents a quantitative approach to 
the works carried out during these periods. Subsequently, an analysis is made of the three main 
variables of  work according to institutional change and the business structure of  the Spanish 
railway: prisoners of  war working for private railway companies, prisoners of  war working for 
army battalions, and prisoners working for private construction companies. Thanks to these 
varied situations, we can better understand how labour supply and productivity levels related 
to company strategies regarding this kind of  labour in different contexts, such as the war econ-
omy, post-war reconstruction, and dictatorship, until 1957.
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■
De empresas y cautivos: las infraestructuras ferroviarias y la lógica econó-
mica del trabajo forzado (España, 1937-1957)
Resumen
Este artículo examina los principales factores explicativos del empleo de presos y prisio-
neros de guerra en la ampliación y reconstrucción del tendido ferroviario durante la Guerra 
Civil Española y la posterior dictadura franquista. La primera parte presenta un análisis cuan-
titativo de trabajos realizados por mano de obra cautiva en los ferrocarriles españoles. Poste-
riormente se pasan a analizar las tres grandes modalidades de trabajo en función del cambio 
institucional y la estructura empresarial del ferrocarril: prisioneros de guerra trabajando para 
compañías privadas, prisioneros de guerra trabajando en batallones militares y presos traba-
jando para compañías constructoras privadas. Gracias a esta variedad de situaciones podemos 
entender mejor en qué medida la oferta de trabajo en el mercado laboral y los niveles de pro-
ductividad están en la base de la diversidad de las estrategias empresariales en diferentes co-
yunturas, como la economía de guerra, la reconstrucción posbélica o los años de dictadura, 
hasta 1957. 
palabRas clave: Trabajo forzado, infraestructuras ferroviarias, empresas ferroviarias, 
Dictadura Franquista, Coerción.
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